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Article 7

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP BY THE PEOPLE
Frank I. Michelman*
We, the People of the United States, . . . do ordain and establish this

Constitutionfor the United States of America.'
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for
the Establishmentof this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.2
This Constitution, and the Laws... which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....

3

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shallpropose Amendments to this Constitution, or, ... shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, . . . shall be valid ... as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof ....
I.

4

CONSTITUTION AS LEGISLATION

The Constitution of the United States is an enacted law, a piece
of legislation, the intentional production of a political will. So, at any
rate, it declares itself, and so we are pleased to regard it. To be sure,
such an authorial view of constitutional origins is the sheerest banality, a view as simplistic as it is inevitable, a commonplace vernacular
notion that cannot withstand critical examination. It is nevertheless a
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This Essay is
excerpted and adapted from my ConstitutionalAuthorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONs 64 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) and is reprinted with
the permission of the Cambridge University Press. Having been unexpectedly and
unavoidably prevented from preparing, in time, a fresh submission to this collection
in Kent Greenawalt's honor, but most urgently wishing not to be missing from the
company, I am thankful for the editors' willingness to accept this offering taken from
previously published work. I picked it because it was initially inspired by Professor

Greenawalt's The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mic:H. L. Rxv. 621 (1987).
That characteristically thoughtful essay was what started me puzzling over how to fit
the Constitution and its role in American constitutional-legal argument together with
my understanding of the deepest messages of contemporary legal positivism.
1 U.S. CONST. preamble.
2

Id. art. VII.

3
4

Id. art. VI, § 2.
Id.art. V.
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fixture in the politics of our country. The Constitution's enactedness,
as we see it, figures crucially in the country's acceptance of the Constitution as supreme law. I examine here the impossible, unrelinquishable idea of the intentional constitution, of constitution as
legislation-or, as it has sometimes been put, as "writing" or as
"written."6
If someone says: "The United States has a strong constitution," we
hear metaphor. The speaker, we gather, is evoking the idea of the
country's hardihood in its environment by likening American society,
government, economy, culture-the country's endowment of organs
and metabolisms, so to speak-to a thriving animal's physical makeup.
By contrast, "The United States has an old constitution" most probably refers to the country's express political charter, or if not exactly to
that, then to the country's somehow otherwise established set of governing norms for "constitutional essentials," meaning (a) the plan of
political government-offices, branches, levels, procedures, power-distributions, and competency ranges-and (b) the roster of personal
rights and liberties, if any, that the constituted government is "bound
to respect." 6 In what follows, we speak of constitutions in this political-regime or charter sense of the term.
Lacking special contextual cues to the contrary, "The United
States has a good constitution" doubtless praises, as well-done, our regime or charter-sense constitution. Incorrigibly, we think of good
constitutional charters or regimes not as blessings that luckily befall a
country as strength and health befall an animal, but as designed creations by responsible human authors: as laws that lawmakers legislate,
and as laws, moreover, whose expressly legislated character is a part, at
least, of what gives them their claim on our allegiance and support.
I mentioned just above a "we" who think in this authorial, authoritarian way of constitutions and their bindingness. I use the term to
refer to whoever reading this will admit to thinking, sometimes, in the
ways I am here beginning to map, my use of it thus representing my
bet that you, Reader, are one of the party, some if not all of the time.
For us (for you), I am saying, a political-institutional constitution has
always-I do not mean constantly, but forever recurrently-the character of a law expressly and designedly laid down by politically circumstanced human agents, which gains its bindingness on us at least in
5

SeeWILLumI

F.

HARRIS

II, THE INTERPRETABLE

CONSTITUTION (1993)

("writing");

Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 (1995)
("written").

6

JOHN RAWLS, PouTICAL LIBERALISM

227 (1993).
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part by force of its reputed intentionality as a product of their express
7
political exertion.
As distinguished from a product of what? There are two major
alternative possibilities to keep in mind, which we may call the existential and the rational. The existentialpossibility: a constitution is binding
as a matter of socio-cultural fact. Or rather, to speak more precisely:
social fact (and nothing directive or evaluative or argumentative or
otherwise rife with intention) is all that a constitution's bindingness
consists in. The rationalpossibility. a constitution is binding (insofar as
it is) as a matter-a dictate-of right reason (insofar as it is). This
gives us, then, a triptych of possibilities: constitutional bindingness-aslaw is (a) "existential," a matter of how things are (what I see that we
in this country just happen to find ourselves doing); 8 or (b) "rational,"
a matter of the right (what I see that reason requires that we do); or
(c) "decisional," a matter of sovereignty (what I see that some agent
whose entitlement to rule I recognize has, as it happens, decided we
are to do).
Let us be clear that no one can hold strictly to all three possibilities at once, which is not to say that anyone can't or we all don't switch
around among them all the time with the speed of light. When and
insomuch as I am feeling bound by some prescription for the reason
that I perceive it to have been laid down as law at some time in the
past by such and such persons having a title to do so, I cannot just
then be feeling bound for the reason that (as I see or judge for my7 See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
16 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) ) [hereafter CONSTrrU-

PHmLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

TIONAUSM]. For a recent, vivid expression of this view, see Bruce Ackerman & David

Golove, Is NAFTA ConstitutionalP,108 HItv. L. Rrv. 799, 907 (1995) (raising the question of "why the Constitution deserves our respect in the first place" and beginning
the answer with a reference to "constitutional self-consciousness"); id. at 908 (continuing the answer with a reference to "citizens" engaged in "a principled overhaul of
constitutional arrangements"); iai at 916 (referring to "America's overriding commitment to popular sovereignty"); id. at 924 (reserving valid constitutional lawmaking for
"those rare moments in American history when the mass of Americans get into the
act").
8 For discussions of good reasons that people might have for preferring not to
monkey with an imperfect constitution currently in force-pertaining, for example,
to the desirability of resolution and stability in the law-see Russell Hardin, Why a
Constitution? in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND m Naw

INSTITuTIoNALYSM 100

(Bernard

Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989); MichaelJ. Perry, What Is "the Constitution"?

(and Other FundamentalQuestions), in CONSTrITUTONAL1SM, supra note 7, at 99; Joseph
Raz, On the Authority and Interpretationof Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,in CONSTrrUTIONAiUSM, supranote 7, at 152; cf. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARv. L. Rxv. 1359 (1997) (advancing similar
reasons for a practice of "judicial supremacy" in constitutional interpretation).
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self) the prescription is right or is currently accepted as law in the
territory where I am. The case, let us suppose, is that I am right now
considering myself bound by something having the look of a law-say,
the Constitution of the United States. If I am consciously doing so in
virtue of the entitlement to rule of whoever laid it down, then, at the
cost of my fealty to their sovereignty, it cannot matter to me whether I
judge it to be right. If I am consciously doing so in virtue of the
thing's being right in my judgment, then, at the cost of my fealty to
the right, it cannot matter to me who laid it down. If I am consciously
doing so for either of those reasons, then, at the cost of my fealty
either to the right or to sovereign entitlement, it cannot matter to me
who else feels bound. And if, on the other hand, I am just being
swept along by a tide of general social acceptance of the thing as law,
then it is not just then mattering to me how or by whom the thing got
laid down or whether it is right in my judgment.
You might object that the following is possible: I see that what my
country's people just happen to find themselves doing is ascribing
constitutional bindingness to the intentional acts of certain agents
under certain conditions, it being their belief (and this belief of theirs
being a part of my description of what they are doing) both that these
agents own a title to decide constitutional matters and that their acts
under these conditions reveal or define what reason requires. 9 Accordingly, I follow suit. You might say this is a case in which all three
of our possible bases of constitutional bindingness are simultaneously
in play. If it seems so, though, that is only because the ultimate motivation of my conduct has not sufficiently been specified. At the very
instant of feeling bound by the contingency of intentional action ("in
that they said so"), I cannot also be feeling bound by rational necessitation ("in that it is right regardless of what anyone may have said
about it") or by intentionless accidents of history ("in that such-andsuch complex legal-recognitional norm just happens to prevail in the

9 See David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF CONsTrrTUONAL AMENDMENT 117 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION], discussed in Frank I.
Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1315-17 (1995); Lawrence G.
Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 902 (1990) ("The claim of
privilege [for popular will]... would have to be that popular will enjoyed a powerful
advantage in accuracy or reliability [given a metric of what makes a political choice
good] over other possible means of choosing among social options.").
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territory where I am").1° And so on around the circle: contingency
clashing with necessity, accident with design.
The focus of my exploration here is the moment in thought in
which, by the internal act of premising allegiance to the Constitution
on its having been authored by whom it was, we set aside, if only momentarily, whatever concerns we may also have with either the brute
facticity or the rational necessity of society's recognition of it as the
basic law of the country. The object of investigation is not, please
note, the bare fact of our regarding the documentary Constitution as
a historical product of known authorship. The obvious reason for that
is that it is, and very interestingly. The issue here is the connection we
draw between perceived historical facts of the documentary Constitution's authorship and the current normative authority for us, as law, of
a body of practical political principles that we take its declarations to
express or represent.
By the "normative authority" of a political directive I mean its serious impingement on our feelings and judgments about what is required and permitted in the conduct of political affairs. The
connection we draw between the current normative authority of the
Constitution and perceived historical facts of authorship ("we ought
to now, because they said so then") I sometimes refer to below as the
"authority-authorship syndrome." I do not mean by "syndrome" to
call the connection pathological, which I do not consider it to be. I
do mean that something strong must be motivating the connection
because, as we shall soon begin to notice, the very thought that the
Constitution's authority flows from its authorship is a sitting duck for
critique.
As we shall see below, explanation for the syndrome does not obviously lie in the ideology of popular sovereignty. Neither does it obviously lie, as you may be thinking it does, in the idea of an
expoundable or interpretable constitution. Perhaps it seems that the
very possibility of the Constitution's force as law-the possibility of
"applying" the Constitution to the run of cases supposed to be under
its legal control-depends on attribution of it to a specified someone's authorship. Lacking such attribution, you might think, one
would lack all basis for referring questions of the Constitution's meaning-in-application to the motive, vision, purpose, aim, or understanding, at any level of generality or abstraction, as of any moment past or
present, of anyone in particular-any "framer" or all of them, any "rat10 For an idea of how complex this legal-recognitional norm is likely to be, see
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621
(1987).
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ifier" or all of them, any past or contemporary court or member
thereof, any past or contemporary electorate or citizenry or "generation."" And wouldn't a so-called text cut off from all such reference
to authorship be strictly meaningless? (How, in that case, could one
even have a basis for construing those marks as tokens of the English
12
language?)
The answers are that it needn't be (and one could). Interpretability of a thing that has the look of being a text in English need not
presuppose the interpreter's belief in its having been intentionally
created by anyone. The thing, let us say, is found "written" in the sand
at the seashore. 13 It might just be a pattern cut by waves; no one is
certain. Legibility does not depend on the answer. As long as it looks
like English words and sentences, you can "read" it if you know English. Furthermore, as long as the words and sentences that it looks
like come somewhere within shouting distance of making sense in
your culture, you can "interpret" it, imbue it with meaning, even if the
apparent meaning is quite unexpected. (It appears to say, "Everyone
has the right to dishwater.")
Now consider the following: In any country, at any time, a legal
culture may sustain some distinct notion (by which I do not necessarily mean an uncontested notion) of the legal category "constitution"
and its office in the ordering of social life. 14 Now, suppose there
comes within our field of vision an object that has the look of being a
text in a language we know, and the text that the object looks like has
the look of being a part of a constitution according to our culturally
embedded notion of that category. The object, by appearance,
roughly fits or calls to mind our constitutional notion. Even if it also
contains variations and anomalies, that object, in our culture, will be
interpretable as a constitution-part.
It may be-the point is a contested one-that application to particular cases of a legal text that is couched in generalities requires
ascriptions of point or purpose. If so, it does not follow that an identified author must be made to appear. The question, say, is how or
11 See Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519
(1997).
12 See HnARY PUTNAM, RFASON, TRUTH, AND HIsTORY 4-5 (1981).
13 The example is adapted from Putnam. See id.
14 In recent American constitutional theory, the writings of Robert Nagel and
Lawrence Sager are notable for having put to fruitful use-in very different ways-the
idea of a culturally embedded notion of constitution. See, e.g, ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CuLTUREs: THE MENTALITY AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1989); Lawrence G. Sager, The Domain of ConstitutionalJustice,in CONSTrrUTIONALSM,
supra note 7, at 235.
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whether "everyone has the right to dishwater" applies to governmental
restrictions on the manufacture of soap. Given a known, historical
author, we could have committed ourselves to answering by doing our
best to seek out that author's intention, expectation, or disposition
with respect to that question. But in the case I am posing, we know of
no author whose disposition we might seek out. Structural relations
among the focal clauses and other parts of the constitutional text (assuming we have the rest available) may doubtless help to frame the
inquiry, but any further inputs of purpose or value will have to be
supplied by the constitutional notion itself, the working theories of
personality and society, and correlatively of government by or under
law, that lead us to see the thing as a piece of a legal "constitution" in
the first place.' 5 Instead of debating what the author meant or contemplated, a group ofjudges, more-or-less sharing a specific, if always
contestable, political-cultural inheritance, would have to debate the
constitutional notion embedded therein. From such a debate they
would have to draw their claims about whether a true or proper constitution, speaking of a "right to dishwater," would or would not most
aptly have meant those terms to have any application to restrictions on
soap manufacture. The task might prove impossible, of course, because the judges might not be able to see anything that a true and
proper constitution could have meant by a dishwater clause, given
their culturally anchored notion of what constitutions are all about.
In that event, it seems, the judges would have no choice but to decline
to give the clause any constitutional-legal force or application. (Try
substituting "to bear arms" for "dishwater.")
The point is that all that I've just described can be done by interpreters while making no supposition whatever about the actual authorship of the constitution. I therefore conclude that the demands
of interpretability cannot explain our urge to trace the bindingness of
a constitution to attributions of its authorship.
I1.

CONSTITUTION AS PROPOSION OF FACT: LEGAL NONvOLFIONISM

A norm for an agent is a directive that the agent does not feel
rightly free to ignore. It is something saying efficaciously to the agent
that not everything is rightly permitted, that within some range of action choices otherwise open to her, at least one ought to be done or
not done. The authority-authorship syndrome is the connection we
draw between two poles of our everyday knowledge of the Constitu15 Interestingly, the model I am sketching here seems to uphold the "textualist
sensibility of American constitutional culture," of which Michael Perry neatly reminds
us in Perry, supra note 8, at 112.
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tion, one of which is our experience of it as a norm or container of
norms. If the Constitution somehow came to figure for us as not a
norm at all (a directive or "ought" statement that we don't feel rightly
free to ignore) but rather only as a fact (a happening of history), then
one of the syndrome's poles would be missing. It would seem, then,
that you could deconstruct the syndrome by teaching people to see
the Constitution as fact not norm. That might seem a tall order, at
least when "norm" is defined broadly enough to include the possibility
of agents gathering directives from what they perfectly well know to be
intentionlessly grown facts of social practice. 16 It could nevertheless
be understood (or rather misunderstood) as the project of a certain
branch of legal positivism.
In contemporary jurisprudential debates, use of the term "legal
positivism" is notoriously vagrant. 17 The term has been used to name
the view that the status of a norm as part of a country's law depends
on facts of social acceptance, either of that norm specifically or of the
authority of certain officers or institutions in a country to pronounce
what norms are and are not law there. Such a broad usage, however,
unfortunately makes a legal positivist of anyone who insists on distinguishing the category of "law" or "the legal" from that of "morals" or
"the moral" (or "reason" and "the reasonable"), if only for the purpose of raising and pursuing the question of the relations between law
and morality. Once that categorial distinction is drawn, who can deny
that to speak of a legal order actually subsisting in a country is always
to speak of an ongoing social process in that country of recognition
and acceptance of that order as the legal order of that country?' 8
A question that then divides legal positivists from other legal theorists is that of the relation, if any, between (a) the possibility of a
norm's being made a valid legal one by social acceptance of it as such
16 Hans Kelsen for some reason defined "norms" more narrowly, as "the [objective] meaning of acts of will that are directed toward the conduct of others." HANs
KELSEN, The Function of a Constitution, in EssAYs ON KELSEN 109-11 (Richard Tur &
William Twining eds., 1986). If, following Kelsen, you define "norm" to include only
such directives as agents see issuing from some other agent's "act of will," then it
becomes relatively easy to defeat any claim that the directive contents of regime-fixing
constitutions are eo ipso "norms." All you then need do to defeat it is establish the
possibility of agents taking direction from what they perfectly well know to be intentionlessly grown facts of social practice.
17 For searching analyses of variant usages, see Jules L. Coleman, Negative and
PositivePositivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalPosi-

tivism, 25 CONN.L. REV. 797 (1993); AnthonyJ. Sebok, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (1997); AnthonyJ. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivism,
93 MIcH. L. REV. 2054 (1995).

18

See Coleman, supra note 17, at 139.
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and (b) the moral status of that norm whether in the eyes of an external observer of the social order in question or of an internal participant in it. Legal positivists deny that either the true moral status of a
norm in the sight of an observer or its perceived moral status in the
sight of participants has any necessary bearing on the possibility of the
norm's being made a legal one by social acceptance of it as such. 19
They assert the possibility of a legal system in which there is neither
"external" nor "internal" connection between considerations of the
transcendent morality of a norm and the efficacy of social acceptance
20
to make the norm truly a legal one.
Within legal positivism thus defined, we can detect a smaller
camp of what I will call "legal nonvolitionists." What distinguishes
them is insistence that the foundations of legal orders are and can
only be organically grown facts of social practice, as distinguished
from acts or expressions of anyone's will.2 1 Straightforwardly, a going
legal system is an effectively regulative social practice of reference to
an identifiable collection or system of norms. Some of the norms are
"primary," immediately regarding what is and is not to be done. Some
are "secondary," regarding the modes and means by which primary
norms are determined. Among the secondary norms are "rules of recoguition," among which there logically must be an "ultimate" rule of
recognition, controlling which purported determinations of primary
normative contents, uttered by whom, in what forms and circumstances, are to be respected and given effect. 22 Below, I shall some-

times refer to this ultimate rule of recognition as the country's basic
law or law of lawmaking. Whatever you want to call it, legal nonvolitionists point out that it cannot itself consist in the command of any
lawgiver because it supplies the standard by which claims to the status
of lawgiver are verified (or not). Therefore, the legal nonvolitionist
19 What H.L.A. Hart calls "soft" positivism (in contradistinction to "plain-fact positivism") allows for the possibility of a legal practice, properly so called, in which people's judgments of justice or morality do in fact figure into the processes of social
acceptance that constitute the practice as a legal one. See H.LA. HART, Postscript, in
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 247, 250-51 (2d ed. 1994). What unites all legal positivists, on
the definition I am offering here, is insistence that it is nevertheless, in the last analysis, only a fact of acceptance, and not anyone's consideration or judgment of the
moral justifiability of the acceptance, that can and does essentially constitute certain
social practices as legal ones.
20 This is a somewhat elaborated version of the "separability thesis" in whatJules
Coleman terms "negative positivism." See Coleman, supra note 17, at 140-43.
21 For example, this is how I understand Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECmON, supra note 9, at 148-52
(referring to works of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart).
22 H.L.A. HART, Ti-m CONCEPT OF LAw 92, 96 (1961).

161 4

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VCOL. 74:5

concludes, the normative system's ultimate ground can only, in the
last analysis, be a social fact that is not itself a norm.
In a legal nonvolitionist account, the authority-as-law of the
American Constitution (and of legislative and judicial law declarations
made in pursuance thereof) flows in the last analysis from facts of
social acceptance of the Constitution-of the collection of secondary
norms in which it consists-as the society's ultimate rule of legal recognition. The point is, social acceptance of the Constitution as
supreme law is a very different matter from acceptance of someone's
entitlement to make the Constitution be supreme law by legislating it as
such. The latter sort of acceptance still traces legal bindingness to
facts about someone's exercise of a legislative will; the former does
not.
It is always possible, of course, that some society's prevailing, ultimate legal-recognitional criterion would appear to take the form:
such-and-such classes or descriptions of persons acting by such-andsuch procedures have authority to legislate whatever they will as this
country's ultimate recognition rule or law of lawmaking. That indeed
appears to be true for the United States, where the strongly prevailing,
although not uncontested view (among those who have a view) is that
such authority was and is available to be claimed by or on behalf of
any collection of actors who did in the past or may in the future successfully carry out the ratification and amendment processes laid out
in Articles VII and V of the Constitution. 23 But you do not faze the

legal nonvolitionist by posing this sort of case, of an apparently ultimate legal recognitional standard cast in terms of someone's authority
to legislate the constitution. When you pose the case, she cheerfully
rejoins that this recognitional standard is itself, then, to all intents and
purposes the country's real law of lawmaking-its "small-c constitution" as I'll sometimes hereafter refer to it, as distinguished from the
"big-C Constitution" whose recognition-as-law the "small-c constitution" underwrites-and that this standard is not itself conceived as a
product of anyone's willful act.2 4 If you object that, to the contrary,
Articles VII and V gain their authority as (secondary, recognitional)
law from a social perception of them as having been approved in certain procedures by certain descriptions of persons ("framers," "ratifiers," the confederation Congress), she justjacks her argument up a
notch (or down, your choice): It is that procedure, then, that is really
23 See Kay, supra note 7. For the contestation, see generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 9. For Articles VII and V, see the epigraphs to this Article.
24 My usage of "small-c constitution" follows that of Frederick Schauer in
Schauer, supra note 21.
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the country's law of lawmaking, and the status-as-law of that procedure, she says, is just a social fact making no reference to anyone's
exercise of will. You and she can replay your respective moves an indefinite number of times moving up (or down) an indefinite number
of notches, but it seems that she must eventually prevail because you
must sooner or later run out of historically plausible enactment
claims. Her point-the legal nonvolitionist's point-is that references
to authorship are in the last analysis inessential to the phenomenon of
legality.
Here, then, is where we have come: everyone who conceptually
distinguishes "law" from "morals" (or "reason") agrees that to speak of
legal ordering in a country-to speak of the country's being in a legally ordered condition-is to speak of social convergence on some
ultimate rule of legal recognition. Legal positivists, properly so-called,
maintain that such a convergence is sufficient for legality regardless of
anyone's view, or of the truth, about the moral status of the recognition rule or of any other norm in the system. Legal nonvolitionists
insist further on the point that such an ultimately grounding so-called
rule or norm is more accurately classed as a fact. It consists in a socially shared understanding of who, selected by what means and
marks and acting by what forms and in what combinations, has final
authority to say what is or will be valid law and to say further what this
law concretely requires of inhabitants and officials in varying circumstances. True, this must be in a quite strong sense an intersubjectively
shared understanding because a crucial part of what inhabitants (or
maybe it is only "officials") must be sharing is awareness of each other
sharing this awareness of a shared understanding. 25 Still, it remains in
the end that the recognition "rule" is neither an intentional production nor a rational necessitation but just a matter of reflexive social
practice being what it is. The "rule" consists in a pattern of interconnected responses on the part of a critical mass of a country's people
(or officials) to certain classes of social events that they've culturally
learned to construe as "Parliament" enacting a "statute," as the "decree" of a "court," as a "police car's" beacon, or what have you. In
sum, according to the legal nonvolitionist view, a country's constitu25 See HART, supra note 19, at 267 ("[S]urely ... an American judge's reason for
treating the Constitution as a source of law having supremacy over other sources includes the fact that his judicial colleagues concur in this as their predecessors have
done."). Hart takes the view that conscious acceptance of the recognitional rule or
practice as such need occur only among legal officials, those whose work requires
them to determine whether a given norm is or is not part of the law, and not necessarily among the population at large who need only "obey." See HART, supra note 22, at
110-13. The difference does not matter for any argument I make here.
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tion-its really operative constitution-is not itself finally graspable as
a prescriptive law or any other kind of norm but only as "a matter of
social fact" to be discovered not by analysis of propositions but by "empirical investigation.

'26

You feel drawn to object. You want to say, by way of counterexample, that-obviously-the Constitution of the United States both
gathers its effective legal force from public accreditation of it as an
intentional act of legislation and is or provides the ultimate rule of
legal recognition in American territory. The legal nonvolitionist then
poses her challenge: You say the Constitution's normative authority or
"pull" flows from a perception of it as the product of someone's act of
laying it down as the country's law of lawmaking. But that view apparently binds you to the further view that the said someone-the framers, the ratifiers-were themselves legally authorized to lay down basic
law to the country in this way. 27 And what law, then, has conferred
that authority on them? Your best rejoinder, I think, would be a law
whose enactment was historically co-original and congruent with certain acts of constitutional lawmaking that it authorized. Why not?
There seems to be no reason why a single transformative passage of
national history cannot contain both and simultaneously (and even
reciprocally) (a) a series of legislatively intended public actions and
events that succeeds, in fact, in laying down law to the country and (b)
the emergence in society-the coming-into-practice-of the precise
"rule of recognition" that the legislative efficacy of this particular series of events implies. For illustration, it seems we need look no further back than the recent history of South Africa, 28 and no further
abroad than the American constitutional founding, the course of
events from the run-up to the Philadelphia convention of 1787
through the convention itself and the aftermath of the ratification. 29
26 Schauer, supra note 21, at 152.
27 Your view, generalized, is that the normative authority of law-like things flows
from facts about who made them. But an authorization to certain agents to make laws
is a law-like thing, see, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I. On your view, then, the normative
authority of such authorizations flows from facts about who made them. You are
headed for deep waters.

28 For a respected journalist's account of the origins of the Constitution of South

Africa, see ALLISTER

SPARKS, TOMORROW Is ANOTHER CouNTRY:.THE INSIDE STORY OF
SOUTH AFlucA's ROAD TO CHANGE (1995).

29

See, e.g.,

BRUCE AcxERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS

passim (1998).

Akhil Amar, to the contrary, argues vigorously (although not in these words) that the
promulgation and ratification of the Constitution were in basic accord with a preexisting rule of recognition. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
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It's a nice thought, this idea of historical coincidence between the
occurrence of a legislative endeavor conforming to a certain (broadly
speaking) procedural specification and the coming-into-being of a social practice of attributing legislative efficacy to endeavors falling
under that same procedural specification. But still this idea misses the
point of the legal nonvolitionist's challenge to your attempt to ground
the Constitution's current legal force in a current perception of it as a
product of someone's past exercise of an entitlement to legislate. The
legal nonvolitionist is making a charge of incoherence against all
claims of this sort. She is saying that no one can right now be basing
the Constitution's authority on its legislated character without, in that
very thought, positing some preconstitutional ground of the authorityto-make-something-be-law-by-legislating-it of whoever is supposed to
have made the Constitution be law by legislating it. The point, in
other words, is that a law that we right now see as legally forceful by
virtue of its having been duly legislated cannot itself right now also be
or contain our legal order's ultimate rule of recognition. 0 So it cannot be, in that sense, what we also think a constitution is.3l
It only remains to point out that if whatever it is-the real or
meta or "small-c" constitution-that is supposed to drape the mantle
of legislative authority on whoever is supposed to have legislated "the
Constitution" is itself, in its turn, conceived as a legislated law, then
the same argument recurses on it. The recursion recurs for as long as
the successive mantles of authority are said to consist in legislated
laws; we tumble in the void of infinite regress. Hans Kelsen saw this
problem long ago.3 2 From it, he deduced what he called "the tran-

scendental-logical condition" of any possible "grounding" of the valid30 See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370 ("[]t is only the present [and
not the past] that can constitute a legal order for a population, and the question of
what [has and should have] the status of law . . . can only be decided nonhistorically.").
31 For a recent vivid example of the view that a country's constitution has to contain the country's ultimate rule of recognition, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text

and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108
RARv. L. REv. 1221, 1246-47 (1995) (speaking of constitutional amendment):
[W]e must look to that Constitution to determine how [the institutions that
it calls into being] are to operate and when their products are to be regarded as law.... We can know that something has the binding force of law
only if it complies with the requirements that, as a matter of social fact, we
have agreed must be met when a law is to be made. Pending some upheaval
[of revolutionary magnitude], the only such requirements for our polity are
those that are, for the time being at least, embodied in our Constitution's
text (footnote omitted).
32 See ,ELsEN, supra note 16, at 111.

1618

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:5

ity of a legal order. "Only a norm," offered Kelsen, can ground "the
validity of another norm."33 Therefore, when we regard a legal order
as grounded we must-logically must-be positing a "historically first
constitution," together with a socially prevailing "basic norm" conferring on that first constitution's promulgators the authority to make it
the law by promulgating it and thereby to obligate the country's posterity (assuming the basic norm remains operative for them) to grant
the force of law to everything that has issued from or pursuant to a
34
chain of amending clauses depending on that first constitution.
Just as the "first constitution" and its promulgators are pure abstractions-"transcendental-logical" categories brought to mind by
the prior determination of a thinker to regard his legal order as
"grounded"-so then is the basic norm. Perhaps that is why contemporary legal nonvolitionism has turned away from Kelsen's dictum
that only a norm can ground the validity of another norm, offering
instead to block the regress by shifting attention from the space of
norms to the space of facts and specifically to the convenient fact that
a critical mass of the country's inhabitants (or officials) do, as it happens, intersubjectively concede a regulative force to an actually operative practice of government that they for some reason or other tend to
identify with (or hypostatize as) a textoid that they call "the
'35
Constitution.
We should be clear, though, that the legal nonvolitionist argument, cogent as it is, leaves unscathed our knowledge that Americans
do in fact recurrently think of the Constitution as containing the ultimate legal grounding, the law of laws, for the American legal order
and, furthermore, as doing so by virtue of its legislated character.
What the nonvolitionist argument aims to show is, first, that if you
insist on finding the "ground" of a social practice of positive legal ordering, you will have to find it in something that is not itself a validated law in terms of the system's own ultimate standards of legal
validation, and second, that the only alternative in sight is the sheer
facticity of the social practice whose ground you are seeking-the
33 Id. at 115.
34 See id. at 114-16. On the reduction, for these purposes, of "small-c constitutions" to their amending clauses, see id.; PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIc, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
35 "Textoid," not "text" or "instrument," is used to make allowance both for textually nonreduced or noncodified (but still institutionally recognizable) constitutions
like the British, as well as for lawyers' knowledge that the political-legal-institutional
Constitution of the United States is not confined to the instrument thus captioned,
but consists also of interpretive and other practices containing and surrounding the
instrument.
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practice, that is, of sooner or later referring all questions of legal validity to those particular standards. But full knowledge of a social prac-

tice includes knowledge of how participants in the practice
experience it "from the inside," so to speak,3 6 and the legal nonvolitionist argument neither says nor decides anything about the internalexperiential dimension of any given society's legal-recognition practice.3 7 More precisely, the argument does not preclude that the practice might be one that has this as one of its features: that participants
refer all questions about legal authority and validity to sets of standards to which, whenever they make such referrals, they attribute the
character of having been intentionally legislated.
The legal nonvolitionist argument accordingly does not contradict the fact of American observance of the authority-authorship syndrome-of tracing the Constitution's bindingness on them at least
partly to its reputation-as-legislated-it only makes it intriguing. In
the face of a compelling refutation of the possibility of any essential

tie between the legal force of a country's constitution and attributions
of its authorship, we persist in tying our constitution's authority for
us-"small-c" and "big-C"-to attributions of its authorship.
I. THE

PEOPLE'S TITLE TO RuLE: SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY, AND

"POLICAL IDENTrI&'

In any search for what might be motivating a population's habit
of tracing a constitution's normative bindingness to perceived facts of
its authorship, a glaringly obvious possibility is the influence on that
population of a theory of sovereignty. Moral bindingness can flow
from legal validity. That is because it is possible for persons to experience or accept a moral obligation (perhaps only presumptive and defeasible) to abide by the law. For those who do, whatever is perceived
to bind them legally also, in some measure, binds them morally. Now,
it seems that to say, with any seriousness, that someone is sovereign in

a country is to ascribe to that person a moral title to rule the country
in whatever way she decides to do. As sovereign, she can promulgate
whatever constitution she wishes, and what will make for her constitution's bindingness on me as an inhabitant, then, will be all and only
36 See ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN,MAX Weber 11-14 (1983); PETER WINCH, THE IDEA
OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELAnON TO PHILOSOPHY (Routledge & Kegan Paul eds.,
1958).
37 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 22, at 238-44 ("[T]here is ... nothing in the
project of a descriptive jurisprudence... to preclude a non-participant external observer from describing the ways in which participants view the law from.., an internal
point of view.").
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my recognition of her moral title to rule. My own judgments of the
rightness of what she rules will be beside the point, as will be my observations regarding anyone else's acceptance of her rule. As long as I
acknowledge her title of rulership, I am bound to follow her constitutional directives to the best of my ability to find out what those directives are and what she meant for them to have me do in one or
another specific set of circumstances. An acknowledgment of sovereignty would thus supply a perfect explanation of the authority-authorship syndrome.
But of course the explanation, as applied to us, is only as good as
its underlying supposition of our attachment to an idea of sovereignty.
And there we run into a complication. For it seems safe to say that we
do not, in fact, recognize the title of anyone in particular to rule a
country ad libitum. Unless, that is, you count the people as someone in
particular. If there is any sovereignty we accredit, it is popular sovereignty. And the case of popular sovereignty, I am now going to argue,
is special in the very respect that it cannot tolerate a separation between judgments of the pretending sovereign's title to rule (or judgments of the pretender's actual identity as the entitled sovereign) and
judgments of the rightness of the pretender's constitutional-legislative
acts.
A.

PopularSovereignty

Constitutionally speaking, "democracy" in our times certainly signifies something beyond the rule of the many or the crowd as opposed to the few, the best, or "the one." The term names a standard
by which a country is not a free one, its inhabitants not free men and
women, unless political arrangements are such as to place inhabitants
under their own political agency, their own "rule." No doubt the prevailing constitutional-democratic ideal does accept a large amount of
rule pro tanto by legislative, administrative, and judicial officers, operating within schemes of representative government. What the ideal
tests, in the end, are the constitutive or fundamental laws of a coun38
try-the laws, that is, that fix the country's constitutional essentials.
There is, however, an ambiguity in the ideal. Does it refer to authorship of a country's fundamental laws by its inhabitants collectively, as
one agent ("the people"), or by them severally as contributing individuals? Here, I want to explore some implications of the collectivistic as
opposed to individualistic conception of the ideal of democratic con38 On "constitutional essentials," see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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stitutional authorship 3 9-a "constitutional populist" conception, as we
have been invited by a leading proponent to call it.4°
Constitutional populism begins with the proposition that, among
requirements of moral rightness in political arrangements, none is
more basic than the entitlement of the people of a country, somehow
conceived as single situs of political agency or energy, to decide the
country's fundamental laws. It may seem directly clear, then, why for
constitutional populists-those who start with the view that a constitution binds morally only insofar as the people are its authors-constitutional-legal authority depends on constitutional-legal authorship. In
this matter, however, appearances are deceiving. For constitutional
populists, as I now undertake to show, the deeper basis of constitutional-legal obligation must be rightness, not authorship. Authorship,
at best, serves as a figure of thought for the supposition of rightness
on which obligation depends.
To begin with, it is only when you attribute sovereignty to someone other than yourself that the authority-authorship syndrome
clearly holds for you with respect to the bindingness on you of the
sovereign's lawmaking acts. If, instead, you attribute sovereignty to
yourself, it seems the syndrome must break. If you, as sovereign, feel
bound at all by what you ruled before, it won't normally be for the
reasons that it was ruled or was ruled by you. If you feel bound at all,
it must be by rightness as you judge it now: what you ruled before still
striking you, on current reconsideration, as the right thing to rule. If
it does not, why shouldn't you, being sovereign, feel utterly free to
discard it? Why should you feel in the least bit bound by your own
former judgment?
The only sort of reason that comes to mind is that you might be
tired or on the blink right now. Here you are, absolute owner of the
country and you in it, morally entitled as such to make laws ad libitum
for it andyou in it, quite irrespective of getting them "right," whatever
that might mean. (That is what it means to be sovereign.) Your only
aim in this matter is for the country, and you in it, to be ruled by you.
If you are out of sorts, not of a mind to rule right now, that aim could
give you reason to abide by what you ruled before, just because it was
you who ruled it, until such time as you might bestir yourself to rule
again. The syndrome would hold.
39 For some probing of the individualist conception, see FRANK I. MICHELMAN,
D DFMocRAcY (forthcoming, 1999); Michelman, supra note *, at 82-91.

BRENAN

40 See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPUuST
MANIFFsro (1994).
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It would hold, that is, as long as we assume either that "you" are
ascertainably still the same person as the one who ruled before, or else
that what matters is not really being ruled by yourself but only being
ruled by a pod with your name on it. So let us now suppose that
neither of those conditions holds. 'You" are not still ascertainably the
same person as the one who ruled before, and genuine self-rule is
indeed what matters. In that case, the syndrome breaks. Insistence
on this point, I believe, confutes the radical separation of will from
reason that the proposition of popular sovereignty is often taken to
involve-the idea, that is, that a sovereign people is free to legislate to
itself whatever damned law it pleases, just because that is what "sovereign" means.
B.

The "Generation"Problem

Explanation begins with the opacity of the notion of the will "of
the people" or a decision "by the people." Few who consider the matter with much seriousness believe that this can plausibly be equated
with a simple tally of votes taken under any conditions whatever, the
41
vote of the majority then standing for the decision of the people.
Among contemporary American constitutional theorists, Bruce
Ackerman is the one who has grappled most seriously with the question of what counts as an expression of the legislative will of the people. Ackerman quite convincingly maintains that, on any plausible
conception of a people's constitutional will that is morally deserving
of respect, that will (or that "people") can never be corporately or
instantaneously present, but can only be represented by time-extended courses of political events. 4 2 Sometimes, Ackerman says, a
course of events can disclose the existence of a "mobilized majority" in
favor of major constitutional change-by which he means a clear,
strong, sustained, and committed majority that arises, consolidates,
and persists over a time during which the fundamental, constitutional
matters in questions are publicly controverted at a high level of energy
and concern. 43 Ackerman believes (and in this respect his view is noncontroversial) that such episodes of constitutionally decisive and transformative popular mobilization have been relatively infrequent in
44
American history.
Frank I. Michelman, "Protectingthe People From Themselves, "or How Direct
41 See, e.g.,
Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1728-30 (1998).
42 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 236, 260-62 (1991).

43

See id. at 274-75, 285-88.

44

See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE

PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS

(1998).
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At a recent conference on "Fidelity in Constitutional Law," announcing in effect what he finds in constitution-space that might be
worthy of his faith, Ackerman pronounced "the generation" to be the
basic unit in American constitutional theory: not "the clause" (for
which read: some existentially self-warranting, autonomously speaking
text) and not "the theory" (for which read: some rightness apple of
the beholder's eye), but "the generation" (for which read: the historically-acting creator of constitutional law)-the creator, that is, on a
full and true of view of who that is. 45 There are two distinct messages
here. The first, and less interesting for our immediate purposes, is
addressed to those who already agree with Ackerman that proper use
of the Constitution today requires reference to past historical acts of
constitutional creation. To them, Ackerman commends the need to
reckon with a certain true fact about historical acts of creation of our
Constitution, to wit: they were done by a succession of somewhat spiritually separated generations. The Constitution we have is a product of
a chronologically ordered but nonlinear ("discontinuous") series of
creative political events, each one of which rejected some but not all
of its predecessors' basic normative premises. As such, then, must the
46
Constitution be construed.
True enough. But when Ackerman posits the generationas the basic object of fidelity-not the clause, not the theory-he certainly intends a further message, the one that mainly concerns us here,
addressed to those who do not already agree with him that proper use
of the Constitution today requires reference to past historical acts and
events. To them, Ackerman urges that indeed it does. He declares
constitutional law to be constituted by a "conversation between generations." 47 Each generation of Americans is "obligat[ed] to honor" the
creativities of every predecessor generation (saving certain barren
ones such as, to date, our own).48 Thus, our task today is to say what
"their sound and fury" means. 49 The message seemingly could not be
clearer: the most compelling what-there-is-to-be-faithful-to, constitutionally speaking, is human political action, the political works and
acts of generations. Fidelity does not run to an impersonal prescriptive text that just happens, heaven only knows how, to be shining
there before us in loco constitutionis. Whatever merits our acceptance-our "reception"5 0 -as constitutional law does so precisely by
45

See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1519.

46 See id. at 1520.
47 Id at 1524.
48 Id. at 1522.
49 Id. at 1523 (emphasis added).

50 IMat 1524.
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virtue of being the works and acts of the generations whose works and
acts it is. Why so? Why not by virtue of being right (if it is), or by
virtue of being there? Because, Ackerman says, of our commitment as
Americans to be governed by ourselves as a people.
But here's the rub. That commitment leaves us with the problem
of telling when we as a people have spoken law. It gives us need for a
rule of recognition of the people legislating. In Ackerman's view, the
root commitment that raises the need also points to the form of the
only admissible answer to it, which is to draw the rule of recognition
from the actual historical practice of the country. The country came
to treat the semi-lawlessly enacted Constitution of the 1780s as its
highest law, as it did with the semi-lawlessly enacted Reconstruction
amendments, and as it now does (so Ackerman contends and many
adamantly deny) with an undocumented constitutional-legal quasi-enactment of the New Deal era. 5 1 The country thus shows to itself what
it counts as a mobilized-majoritarian apparition of the legislating people. On this matter, as on others, our task is nothing more nor less
than to listen to ourselves. What could be more in the spirit of democracy as popular self-rule?
The difficulty is the same as it has ever been (call it "countermajoritarian,"5 2 call it "inter-temporal"5 3 ). They-the generations of
the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal-are not in any obvious or self-proving way in unity or unison with us the living. But
given that they are not, for us to submit in any degree to governance
by their say so-including not least their say so regarding rules of recognition-is for us in that same degree to be not governing ourselves.
What some prior generation did as distinguished from what we might
do is extraneous, it would seem, to our self-government, as long as it
remains agreed that they (then) are not us (now).
C. All in the Family: "PoliticalIdentity" and Rightness
Ackerman has a response: granted, predecessor generations are
not us. Neither, on good authority, is Congress us, nor any other contemporary organ of representative government. 54 If what we mean by
democracy is the rule of the people, we must also understand that this
51

See ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 4-15.

52

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

16-23 (1962).
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,93 YALE L.J.

THE BAR OF POLITICS

53

1013, 1046 (1984).
54 See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv.L. REV. 4,
75 (1986) ("The Air Force is not us. Congress is not us. The President is not us. 'We'
are not 'in' those bodies. Their determinations are not our self-government. Judges
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people appears in action only sporadically, in moments of exceptional
political mobilization which it may not be granted to every generation
to know. So in this world of generational finitude and change (not to
add, of variable stature among the generations), to ask for perfect democracy is to ask for too much. The best that any on coming generation can do, if it means to be ruled by the people, is to receive as its
law the most recent word from an adequately mobilized American citizenry, pending that on coming generation's own arousal (if ever) of
the people slumbering within it.
With that in mind, suppose someone, an American, says that his
sole objective in life is to live in compliance with a constitution that
truly corresponds to the contemporary will of the contemporary
American people. I emphasize contemporary. This person sees no
moral or other value in being ruled from the grave by dead people.
What moves him is the idea that the living should together rule their
own lives in their own country. But he finds himself in a state of puzzlement about how he can possibly know what is the constitutional will
of the contemporary American people, which is his sole object in life to
abide by. So he takes a leaf from Bruce Ackerman's book. He allows
himself to be persuaded by Ackerman that the best evidence he can
hope to have of the will of the contemporary American people is the
facts about where matters constitutional were last left (in the year
1937, let us say) by the series of constitutionally decisive, popular mobilizations that have previously occurred in American history.
Here you have a genuine case of the authority-authorship syndrome. Our hero is minded to abide by the Constitution "because
they said so," no further questions asked. Given his objective-to live
under laws corresponding to the (contemporary) people's will-his
readiness to find dependable direction toward that objective in past
historical acts and events not only relieves him but rationally bars him
from any further direct inquiry of his own. In this matter, he does
truly equate what he ought to do with whatever they said.55 The authority-authorship syndrome holds for him. Of course, it does so only
in a special way, by virtue of a special feature in his syndrome, its
moral motivation. Submission to authority may not always be morally
motivated, but in our hero's case it is. His attitude is certainly not one
of moral detachment or indifference to the right. As a constitutional
populist, he thinks it morally right to submit himself to the fundamenoverriding those determinations do not, therefore, necessarily subtract anything from
our freedom, although the judges also, obviously, are not us.").
55

For definitive discussion of the kind of heuristic or epistemic authority I am

pointing at here, see JOSEPH RAz, MoRAL=r

OF FREEDOM

21-105 (1986).
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tal-legal will of the contemporary people. He submits to the authority
of past political events because, and only because, he aims to do what
is right, having himself assumed responsibility for the judgment that
what is right in these matters is submission to the contemporary people's will. But that, as we are about to see, is not the only or, perhaps,
the most telling sense in which a rightness judgment undergirds his
attitude of acceptance of what "they" said as normatively authoritative
for him.
Our hero hazards a probability estimate that the constitutional
doings of prior generations of Americans-dead Americans-point
with acceptable accuracy toward the will of the contemporary people
respecting matters constitutional. On what basis, however, can he
count this estimate a rational one? The estimate depends on the supposition that each politically mobilized generation in the American
series is an episode or representation of one and the same political
family, so to speak, periodically exercising one and the same familyowned tite to collective self-rule. But this succession of mobilizational
episodes might also, after all, be construed as a temporal series of dif
ferent collective agencies, strangers to each other, each possessed of its
own discrete entitlement to rule over its own affairs.
The point is that, to think of a people living under a fundamental-legal regime that they themselves make or adopt, is already by the
thought to confer upon "the people" an identity that is in some respect continuous across events of constitutional mobilization and constitutional change. The people need not be unchanging across the
higher legislative divide: agents can change through their acts without
loss of identity. (My biography is different after writing this than it was
before.) But we do need to fix on something about this people that
might warrant our calling them the same people after as they were
before the event. Unable to affirm a relevant sameness between those
who decide upon constitutional innovation and those who must live
with the decision, we could not seriously speak of a people living
under its own rule.
Popular sovereignty no doubt conceives of constitutional lawmaking events as deliberate acts of a "capital-P People" legislating. What is
tricky is that these People legislate not only to the official agentscongresses, presidents, courts-whom they charter or "constitute" by
their higher lawmaking acts, but to themselves as the self-same (selfgoverning) People as those who legislate. They do so at least insomuch as every constitution (worthy of the name) is a law containing a
binding rule about how itself (including this rule of which we just now
speak) may thenceforth be revised. In the Constitution of the United

1999]

CONSTITUTIONAL

AUTHORSHIP

1627

States, this rule (most observers think) is Article V.56 It looks like
there is a dimension of political freedom that we both attribute to the
chartering People (represented as the authors and ratifiers of Article
V) and deny to the People as thus chartered, that is, the freedom to
decide the terms and conditions of higher lawmaking. The charterers
('We the People of the United States") seem to stand, then, on a different plane of rulership from the chartered ("our posterity"), as creators to creatures. How is it possible to construe such an event as one
of the People's self-government?
There are possibility conditions for this, but they are stringent.
For a People to be self-governing means for them to legislate to themselves as the self-same (if also the ever-changing) People as those who
legislate. This means that the lawmaking act emanates from a People
whose collective character, or "political identity" (to use Bruce Ackerman's nice term),57 not only continues through the process of enactment undissolved but also, by the same token, was already established
when the process began. We need to say, then, what it is that we think
confers political identities on empirical human aggregates, identities
of a sort that allow us to check for the sameness of the People who lay
down constitutional law with the People to whom it is laid down.
What do we think this people-constituting, identity-fixing factor could
possibly be? Must it not finally come down to an attitude of expectation or commitment shared by constituent members of the putative
"capital-P People?" An attitude of expectation of the presence among
them of some substantially contentful normative like-mindedness, or
at the very least of commitment to searching out the possibility of this?
An expectation of, or commitment to, some cultural or dispositional
or experiential commonality from which they can together try to distill some substantially contentful idea of political reason or right?
Something-could it be-along the lines of that constitutional-cul58
tural "notion" to which I have previously made reference?
Think about how matters look from the standpoint of the People
on the receiving side of a constitutionally decisive mobilization. As a
56 We noticed in supra note 23 that a minority of theorists hold to the view that
Article V is not correctly construed as setting forth the exclusive procedural avenue to
valid amendments of the Constitution. The minority theorists do not, however, all
suggest that the Constitution, correctly construed, contains no binding amendment
rule at all. Althil Amar says the Constitution's rule is a deliberative majority vote. See
Amar, supra note 29.
57 See AcaEMmAN, supranote 42, at 204. Ackerman writes, it seems to me paradoxically, of "an entire People ... break~ing] with its past and construct[ing] a new
political identity for itself." Id.; see also Michelman, supra note 9, at 1325.
58 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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supposedly self-governing people, they cannot accept law from anyone
save themselves. But it seems they can know themselves as themselves-can know themselves as, so to speak, a collective political
self-only by knowing themselves as a group of sharers, joint participants in some already present, contentful idea, or proto-idea, of political reason or right. This means they can know their lawgivers as
legitimate, as the same People as they are, only through the lawgivers'
perceived or supposed participation in some political-regulative idea
that they right now hold about what constitutions are for and are supposed to do. What we're saying here, in effect, is that a population's
conception of itself as self-governing, as legislating law to itself, depends on its sense of its members as, in their higher lawmaking acts,
commonly and constantly inspired by and aspiring to some distinct
regulative idea of political justice and right.
What it comes down to is this: for anyone committed to the pursuit of popular sovereignty for the sake of the value of political selfgovernment-the value of a population's being under its own political
rule (and why else be committed to the pursuit of popular sovereignty?)-acts of legitimate constitutional lawmaking can never within
history be conceived as writing on a clean slate. Rather, such acts
must always be conceived as outcomes of political interactions that
were already framed, when they occurred, by some already present
idea of constitutional reason, some constitutional-cultural "notion."
As devotees of self-rule by the people, we do not and cannot grant
binding force to any predecessor constitutional lawgivers' say so just
because it was theirs, without an identity check to make sure that they
and we are relevantly the same people, and there appears to be no
such relevant check apart from our currentjudgment of whether what
they did was in accord, or at least tending toward accord, with constitutional reason as it may be given to us the living to know it. In other
words, constitutional framers can be our framers-their history can be
our history, their word can command observance from us now on
popular-sovereignty grounds-only because and insofar as they, in our
eyes now, were already on what we judge to be the track of true constitutional reason. (What if their words include, "Everyone has the right
to dishwater"? "The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed"? "No State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate"?)
We see a hermeneutical circle closing. I have been arguing that,
in the production of present-day legal authority, constitutional framers have to be figures of rightness before they can be figures of history, our history. But if so, then present-day constitutional
interpreters, dedicated to the support of the contemporary normative

1999]

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP

iL629

authority of the Constitution, have no choice but to read the words of
the framers with the interpretive charity of the living. In that respect,
my argument here is incidentally intended to make trouble for those
who assert that a strongly textualist mode of constitutional interpretation follows directly from the premise that "the Constitution . ..derives its power to restrain from assumptions about [a] historical act
that created it."59
But we shouldn't lose sight of our main question. If it is true that,
in the production of present-day legal authority, the framers must in
our eyes be figures of rightness before they can be figures of history-our history-why, then, is not their history superfluous to the ongoing
enterprise of constitutional application? Why do we not dispense altogether with the framers-their authority, I mean, not their wisdomand look to rightness directly? Beyond respect and gratitude for their
wisdom, what is it that we owe to them?

59

See Kay, supra note 7, at 31.

163o

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

74:5

